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Background: Since its discovery in 2012, over 1700 confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
have been documented worldwide and more than a third of those cases have died. While the greatest number of
cases has occurred in Saudi Arabia, the recent export of MERS-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) to Republic of Korea showed
that a pandemic is a possibility that cannot be ignored. Due to the deficit of knowledge in transmission
methodology, targeted treatment and possible vaccines, understanding this virus should be a priority. Our aim was
to combine epidemiological data from literature with genetic information from viruses sequenced around the
world to present a phylodynamic picture of MERS spread molecular level to global scale.
Methods: We performed a qualitative meta-analysis of all laboratory confirmed cases worldwide to date based on
literature, with emphasis on international transmission and healthcare associated infections. In parallel, we used
publicly available MERS-CoV genomes from GenBank to create a phylogeographic tree, detailing geospatial timeline
of viral evolution.
Results: Several healthcare associated outbreaks starting with the retrospectively identified hospital outbreak in
Jordan to the most recent outbreak in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia have occurred. MERS has also crossed many oceans,
entering multiple nations in eight waves between 2012 and 2015. In this paper, the spatiotemporal history of MERS
cases, as documented epidemiologically, was examined by Bayesian phylogenetic analysis. Distribution of
sequences into geographic clusters and interleaving of MERS-CoV sequences from camels among those isolated
from humans indicated that multiple zoonotic introductions occurred in endemic nations. We also report a
summary of basic reproduction numbers for MERS-CoV in humans and camels.
Conclusion: Together, these analyses can help us identify factors associated with viral evolution and spread as well
as establish efficacy of infection control measures. The results are especially pertinent to countries without current
MERS-CoV endemic, since their unfamiliarity makes them particularly susceptible to uncontrollable spread of a virus
that may be imported by travelers.
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After the identification of a novel coronavirus (CoV) in
2012, later named Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS)-CoV, there has been a rise in cases reported
worldwide. As of June 23, 2016, the World Health
Organization (WHO) reported 1768 confirmed cases and
630 deaths, yielding case fatality of 35.6% [1]. Cases have
been reported from 27 countries, spanning European,
Asian, North American and African continents (Fig. 1).
Majority of the cases occur in the MERS endemic region
of Middle East, but the recent export of the virus to Korea
showed that MERS-CoV can spread rapidly if unchecked
by early detection and infection control measures [2]. The
number of cases has climbed since its initial discovery,
with just 9 cases identified in 2012, 168 in 2013, 768 in
2014, 683 in 2015 and 140 so far in 2016 (Fig. 2).
MERS-CoV
MERS-CoV is the second coronavirus after Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-CoV with the potential to
cause a pandemic [3]. Characterized by its ‘corona’ or
crown shape, it is a single-stranded RNA virus with ap-
proximately 30,000 nucleotides in its genome.
While current literature mostly concur that camels are
important zoonotic reservoirs for MERS-CoV, there has
been some evidence that bats might be primary viral
reservoirs and that MERS-CoV will jump to a different host
such as dromedary camels, and subsequently humans, when
opportunities arise; similar transmission dynamic has been
observed with SARS-CoV where palm civets acted as inter-
mediary host between bats and humans [4, 5]. However
coronaviruses isolated from bats are more genetically distant
from human MERS-CoV than those isolated from camels,
which have shown very high similarities to humans’ [6].
Virus transmission from camels is thought to be con-
nected to consuming camel milk or urine, working withFig. 1 Map of MERS cases reported worldwide as of June 2016 according t
color indicates countries that reported less than or equal to 5 cases, includ
Germany, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines,
color shows countries with greater than 5 but less than 100 cases (Iran, Jor
countries have had more than 101 cases (Saudi Arabia and Korea)camels and/or handling camel products [7]. Secondary
transmissions are largely associated with hospitals or close
contacts of MERS cases. As shown with the family cluster
in the United Kingdom (UK), relatives or people living in
close contact with an infected patient are susceptible to
the pathogen even outside of hospital settings [8].
While the exact methods of MERS-CoV transmissions
are unknown respiratory droplet and aerosol transmissions
are cited as most probable, but there is no conclusive
evidence on how close a person has to be for exposure and
what protection is most suitable [3, 9]. For example, the
Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare (KMoH) classified
close contacts as those who were within 2 meters of MERS-
CoV infected patient or in contact with respiratory droplets
without personal protective equipment, yet the extent to
which of those close contacts were infected is unknown
[10]. It has been hypothesized that camels can transmit a
higher dose of viruses to humans while the quantity is lower
between humans, and that MERS-CoV has not fully
adapted for human-to-human transmission [11, 12]. Food,
oral-fecal, and fomite transmissions are also possible trans-
mission routes since the virus has been detected in camel
milk, patient fecal sample and hospital surfaces [13–16].
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Patients with MERS have a wide range of symptoms from
being completely asymptomatic to suffering from severe
respiratory illnesses. Fever cough, chills and myalgia are
some of the most commonly reported symptoms in mild
cases, but respiratory distress, kidney failure and septic
shock have been reported in acute cases [17, 18]. There
are neither vaccines nor specific medications against
MERS-CoV, so treatments are usually palliative in nature
[17, 19]. More than a third of those infected with MERS-
CoV die [1]. For comparative perspective, case fatality was
one in ten for the SARS pandemic of 2003 [20].o WHO [1]. Countries in grey have had no cases of MERS. Light pink
ing imported cases (Algeria, Austria, Bahrain, China, Egypt, France,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, United States, and Yemen), medium pink
dan, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates), and red colored
Fig. 2 Summary of MERS cases from March 2012 to May 2016. Incidences summarized by month and by 4 regions of the globe where infected
patients have been found: Middle East, Europe/North America, Africa, and Asia. Orange line indicates cumulative number of cases
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symptoms and transmissibility. Given that clinical proce-
dures for acute patients can generate aerosolized viral
particles, patients with severe respiratory distress would be
more likely to transmit the virus compared to asymptomatic
patients, but transmissibility of airborne MERS-CoV is un-
known [12]. In addition, research in transmission is essential
with regards to ‘superspreaders’ who are sources for large
number of cases for healthcare associated outbreaks [21].
Possibility of global outbreak
The uncertainty of pathogen transmission, lack of vaccine
against MERS-CoV and deficit in MERS specific treat-
ments make public health interventions challenging to
design [22]. With ease of international travel, the possibility
of MERS spread is present in all nations. Notably, countries
without MERS endemic are unfamiliar with the infectious
agent that may be imported by travelers and are, therefore,
particularly vulnerable.
In this paper we reviewed epidemiological contact
tracing information from public health agencies and
peer-reviewed literature, in order to see geographic and
temporal distribution of MERS cases around the globe.
Concurrently, we used genetic sequences to infer trans-
mission dynamics and inter-host evolution of MERS-
CoV. The combined analysis was used to present a phy-
lodynamic picture, detailing international, zoonotic and
healthcare associated transmissions at genetic and
population levels. These analyses can be used to under-
stand pathogen spread and to implement public health
measures to curb a pandemic [23].
Methods
Literature review
Detailed review of current literature was conducted using
the five-step model of Khan et al. [24]. The literature
searches on PubMed used following keywords: “Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome”, “MERS” and “MERS CoV”.
The article’s potential relevance to our topic was examined
initially by article title then by abstract content. Includedpapers were case reports and articles on phylogenetics,
healthcare related outbreaks and epidemiology, and we ex-
cluded papers on viral structure and model organism re-
search. Relevant publications from national and
international public health agencies were reviewed as well.
WHO’s Disease Outbreak News and MERS risk assess-
ments spanning September 2012 to June 2016 were used
as primary sources to create a map of global transmissions
[1]. The data were supplemented with the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)’s
Communicable Disease Threats Reports and Korean Cen-
ter for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and
KMoH reports published online [25, 26]. Number of cases
in hospital settings and non-hospital settings were com-
pared using Mann-Whitney U test in SAS software v9.4
for Windows [27]. Following the literature review, forest
plots of basic reproduction numbers were created using
DistillerSR Forest Plot Generator [28].
MERS-CoV genetic sequences
MERS-CoV sequences isolated from humans and camels
were downloaded from the GenBank repository and are
listed in Additional file 1 [29]. Combined Open Reading
Frames 1a and 1b (ORF1a/b) region was chosen specific-
ally for the high number of sequences available and low
phylogenetic noise in order to create the most inform-
ative phylodynamic analyses. Duplicate sequences from
single patients were excluded to explore inter-host dy-
namics without intra-host evolution, and only sequences
with known date and place (city, state or country) of col-
lection were included. Based on the metadata associated
with the GenBank accession, we created three datasets:
first with all CoV sequences isolated from both humans
and camels, second dataset with solely sequences from
humans, and third only with sequence from camels.
The sequences were aligned using Clustal X and manu-
ally edited using BioEdit [30, 31]. Then the best fitting nu-
cleotide substitution model was chosen via hierarchical
likelihood ratio test with ModelTest implemented in
PAUP*4.0 [32, 33].
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Three preliminary analyses were performed prior to
Bayesian analysis: recombination, phylogenetic signal and
temporal signal tests. First, identification of recombinant
strains was done using Bootscan/Recscan method in
RDP4 with default window size and parameters [34, 35].
Second phylogenetic signals in the datasets were inves-
tigated with TREE-PUZZLE [36]. It reported maximum
likelihood for each new tree generated as a single dot on
a triangle. The distribution of these dots among the
seven zones of the triangle indicated their phylogenetic
signals: if a dot was located in the central triangle, its
tree had unresolved phylogeny with star-like structure. If
a dot was located in the sides of the triangle, the phyl-
ogeny was network like and only partially resolved.
Lastly, if the dot was positioned in one of the three cor-
ners, the tree topology was considered fully resolved
[37].
Third, amount of evolutionary change over time, or
temporal signal, from the sequences was examined using
TempEst [38]. The three datasets were analyzed separately
using default parameters.
Coalescent model for demographic history
In order to conduct Bayesian phylogenetic analyses on
MERS-CoV evolution three parameters for demographic
growth model were tested: (1) molecular clock, (2) prior
probability distribution and (3) marginal likelihood esti-
mator. First, molecular clock was calibrated using dates
of sample collection with the Bayesian Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method in BEAST v1.8 [39]. Both
strict and relaxed molecular clocks were tested, but re-
laxed clock with underlying lognormal distribution was
superior. For the investigation of demographic growth of
MERS-CoV ORF1a/b, four independent MCMC runs
were carried out each with one of the following coales-
cent prior probability distributions: constant population
size, exponential growth, Bayesian Gaussian Markov
Random Field (GMRF) skyride plot and Bayesian skyline
plot [40–42]. Both parameters listed above were tested
with path sampling and stepping stone marginal likeli-
hood estimators [43, 44].
Best fitting model was chosen by comparing the Bayes
Factors [45]. If log (Bayes Factor) was >1 and <3, there
was weak evidence against the model with lower mar-
ginal likelihood [43]. Higher log values indicated stron-
ger evidence, such that values greater than 3 and 5 were
considered to give strong and very strong evidence,
respectively.
For all three datasets, the MCMC sampler was run for
at least 50 million generations, sampling every 5000 gen-
erations. Only parameter estimates with effective sample
size (ESS) greater than 250 were accepted to ensure
proper mixing of the MCMC.Phylogeographic analyses
Phylogeographic analyses were conducted also using
Bayesian-MCMC method in BEAST using (1) best fitting
nucleotide substitution model chosen by ModelTest, (2)
relaxed molecular clock with underlying lognormal rate
distribution, (3) GMRF skyride plot as demographic
model and (4) evolutionary rate previously estimated
with sample collection dates. For all three datasets, the
MCMC chains were run for at least 100 million genera-
tions and sampled every 10,000 steps. Using the stand-
ard continuous time Markov chain over discrete
sampling locations (31 cities and countries) and Bayesian
Stochastic Search Variable Selection procedures to infer
social network, phylogeographic analyses were carried
out for total and human datasets [46]. For the camel
subset, continuous geographical trait analysis was used
since spatial distribution of the MERS-CoV from camels
was presumed not to be independent of their genetic
phylogeny [47].
Maximum clade credibility trees which had the largest
product of posterior clade probabilities, were selected
after 10% burn-in using Tree Annotator, part of the
BEAST package [39]. Calculations of posterior probabil-




We retrieved 196 MERS-CoV sequences from GenBank
88 from camels and 108 from humans, to analyze
molecular evolution of the coronavirus over time
(Additional file 1). All available ORF1a/b sequences as of
March 16, 2016 were included and their dates ranged
from April 2012 to the latest deposited sequences of
June 2015. These sequences were from: China, Egypt,
France, Germany, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Korea,
Thailand, UAE, UK and US [48]. Main dataset with all
sequences, subset with only sequences from humans,
and third subset with sequences from camels were
created.
Sequences were aligned with Clustal X and four were
removed due to poor alignment (GenBank accession
numbers: KJ361499 KJ156916, KJ156941 and KJ156942).
Due to possibilities of recombinant MERS-CoV
strains, aligned sequences were tested for recombination
via RDP4 [49–51]. Sequences 441SA15 and 451SA15
had similarities to two different strains, 470SA15 and
355SA13 and were removed from the dataset since re-
combinant strains could convolute the evolutionary ana-
lysis (results shown in Additional file 2: Figure S1).
Then the phylogenetic content of ORF1a/b region was
investigated by likelihood mapping method to ensure
that there were enough signals to compute phylogenies
[36]. The percentage of dots, or noise level, falling in the
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man sequences only, and 3.2% for camel sequences only
(Additional file 2: Figure S2a, b and c respectively). For
all three datasets, the three corners of the triangles
summed to be greater than 95% and the central triangles
had less than 30% noise, so we expected fully resolved,
tree-like phylogenies [37].
Temporal signal of the sequences was also investi-
gated. Temporal signal refers to how much genetic
change has taken place between sampling times which is
especially important in this case since samples were col-
lected over time [38]. In order to make molecular clock
inferences, genetic distances on phylogenetic trees have
to be translated into temporal distances. Root-to-tip di-
vergence plots are shown in Additional file 2: Figure
S3a, b and c; no major deviations from the regression
line were observed indicating that the genetic divergence
of the sequence more or less align with what is expected
given the sequence sampling date. The regression plots
for the main dataset and the human subset had R2
values of 0.75 and 0.63, respectively, indicating a strong
association while the camel subset had R2 of 0.42 which
was weaker but still positive.
Finally the datasets were analyzed for their evolution-
ary history over time and space using BEAST. The
Tamura-Nei 93 (TN93) evolutionary model with gamma
distribution G = 0.05 was chosen by ModelTest as best
fit. The GMRF skyride plot with stepping stone marginal
likelihood estimator was selected as the best demo-
graphic model by BEAST. Phylogeographic trees of the
main dataset is shown in Fig. 3 and the camel set is
shown in Fig. 4 (main dataset colored according to
countries is available as Additional file 2: Figure S4 and
human set trees are included as Additional file 2: Figures
S5 and S6).
Overview of outbreaks and exports
Over 1300 MERS cases, or almost 80% of global inci-
dence, have been reported from Saudi Arabia [1]. Korea
has the second highest number of cases (n = 185) and
United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 83 cases is third [1].
In the past three years since discovery of MERS-CoV,
eight major healthcare associated outbreaks have been
reported worldwide; the ninth wave recently occurring
in multiple cities of Saudi Arabia. Those described here
are based on cases with documented nosocomial trans-
mission and are indicated by blue colored clusters in
Fig. 5. Cases of MERS patients traveling internationally
are indicated by arrows representing the direction of
their travel and probable zoonotic transmission cases are
marked by brown camels in the same figure.
The first hospital related outbreak was in Zarqa,
Jordan where 2 cases were confirmed for MERS-CoV
and 11 were declared probable cases retrospectively [52].At the time of this outbreak in April, source of the re-
spiratory illnesses was unknown, but it was later deter-
mined to be identical to the novel coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) identified in the following September [52–54]. In
total, nine cases were reported in 2012, and these early
sequences, 389JO12, can be seen at the top of the tree in
Fig. 3.
In January of 2013, UK reported an intra-familial clus-
ter of 3 where the index case had traveled to Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia [8]. The three cases (245GB13, 9GB13
and 10GB13 in Fig. 3) formed a distinct cluster in our
tree, as expected, since the viruses isolated would have
great genetic similarity consistent with proximity of the
dates and location of infection. Secondary transmission
occurred in France where the CoV was transmitted to a
patient sharing a hospital room with a MERS confirmed
case who had traveled to UAE [55, 56].
A major outbreak at several hospitals in the Al-Hasa
region of Saudi Arabia occurred around April 2013 where
epidemiological investigation linked 23 MERS cases to
dialysis and intensive care units [57–59]. These are indi-
cated in orange near the middle of the phylogenetic tree
(Fig. 3). From June to August of the same year, there was a
community outbreak in Hafr al-Batin where 12 patients
were infected [60]. Although there was a transmission to a
healthcare worker, the rest of the patients in this cluster
were presumed to have gathered for the large, regional
camel market, and therefore, both zoonotic and human-
to-human transmissions may have occurred simultan-
eously. Interestingly, both the Al-Hasa and Hafr-al-Batin
outbreaks cluster with sequences from Riyadh, which may
indicate travel of persons, and possibly MERS-CoV with
them, to and from this capital city.
In the following year from March to June of 2014, the
biggest outbreak to date was reported from multiple
countries: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and Jordan [61–64].
Sequences from patients during this time distinctly
separated into three clusters, Jeddah cluster (in green),
Abu Dhabi cluster (red) and Riyadh cluster (pink), and
they can be seen forming independent clades on the
tree. And concurrently, there were at least 13 cases of
exported MERS in UAE, Jordan, Philippines, Malaysia,
Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Netherlands, Qatar, United States
(US), Turkey and Austria via travelers who visited Saudi
Arabia as shown in Fig. 5 [1, 26, 65–67].
In 2015, a traveler who visited the Arabian Peninsula
was the index case in the largest outbreak of MERS out-
side of the Middle East, affecting 185 patients and inciting
national panic in South Korea [2, 19, 68]. Nosocomial
transmissions were reported from six hospitals, especially
prevalent in two major medical centers, where 3 super-
spreaders have been linked to 166 cases [2]. When total
number of cases are compared, nosocomial incidence is
distinctly greater than incidence of community acquired
Fig. 3 (See legend on next page.)
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Fig. 3 Time-scaled phylogeographic tree of MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences isolated from humans and camels. Each color shown in legend represents
city or region of sampled sequence (tip branches) as well as ancestral lineage (internal branches) inferred by Bayesian phylogeography. Vertical blue
lines encompass sequences collected at the time of outbreaks and brown camel symbols indicate sequences isolated from camels. An asterisk (*) along
the branch represents the posterior probability for each clade greater than 0.90. Double asterisks (**) indicate > 0.95. Triple asterisks (***) indicate >0.99
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nificant, p < 0.0001) and superspreading may be the cul-
prit. Son of a Korean MERS patient traveled to China and
tested positive there (313CN15) [69]. The cluster involving
Korean and Chinese samples seem most closely related to
Saudi Arabian strain (465SA15) which was isolated from
Hofuf.
In the Middle East, there was an outbreak in King
Abulaziz Medical Center in Riyadh with 130 cases from
June to August as well as multi-facility outbreaks in
Riyadh and Madinah from September to November of
2015 [1, 26, 70]. In 2016, an outbreak in Buraidah ofFig. 4 Time-scaled phylogeographic tree of MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences
region of sampled sequence (tip branches) as well as ancestral lineage (int
posterior probability for the clade >0.90. ** for >0.95 and *** for >0.99Saudi Arabia occurred in February and March [1, 26].
And recently, an outbreak in a Riyadh hospital with 24
cases due to superspreading occurred mid-2016 [71].
Basic reproduction number
A wide range of basic reproduction numbers (R0) from
0.32 to 1.3, has been reported for MERS and are summa-
rized in Fig. 6 [9, 14, 21, 72–79]. Most researchers agree
that MERS has a low potential to become a pandemic at
this point in time, but once the CoV is introduced in a
nosocomial setting, the R0 can range from 2 to 6.7 and
even from 7 to 19.3 [75, 78].isolated from camels. Each color shown in legend represents city or
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Fig. 5 Worldwide epidemiological contact tracing summarized for MERS cases from April 2012 to May 2016. Countries are listed on the left and
timeline is shown across the middle as x-axis, years indicated on top of the horizontal black line and months below. Circles represent the number
of MERS cases reported for the month and blue color is used to indicate times when hospital related clusters were reported. Brown camel
symbols indicate possible zoonotic transmissions due to handling of camels or consumption of its products. Key is shown in the upper right
hand corner. Arrows indicate travel of MERS cases, with the tail of the arrow indicating country the patient visited prior to getting diagnosed in
the country indicated by the arrowhead. In case of multinational travel, extra arrowheads are used to represent travel stops
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After two farm workers tested positive for the CoV,
Qatar and WHO carried out an investigation of camel
related MERS cases in October 2013 [80]. All 14 of their
camels tested positive for MERS-CoV antibodies and 11
were positive for the virus itself. The partial sequences
of the MERS-CoV sampled from camels were found gen-
etically similar to the human samples. Parallel case was
observed in Saudi Arabia, where researchers were able
to pinpoint the specific camel that carried a 100% genet-
ically identical virus as the patient [81]. These sequences
(11SA13 and 12SA13) can be seen clustering together at
the top of Fig. 4.
Sequences from camels can be seen interspersed
throughout the tree in Fig. 3. When the camel sequences
are examined alone (Fig. 4) it is easy to see that MERS-
CoV from UAE form distinct clusters on their own (in
red) while those from Saudi Arabia seem to have mul-
tiple clades. In our camel subset analysis, the United
Arab Emirates clade diverged from Saudi Arabiansequences early, right after our estimated time to most
recent common ancestor (tMRCA) of all taxa (March
2012 with 95% confidence intervals: July 2011-November
2012). This clade also includes some Al-Hasa sequences;
Al-Hasa is the easternmost region of Saudi Arabia and
therefore, geographically closest to UAE. The intermixing
of Jeddah and Riyadh sequences in the bottom half of the
tree may be explained by the camel trades that occur be-
tween these two large cities.
We analyzed the data separately for sequences isolated
from humans and camels in order to ascertain when the
introduction of MERS-CoV occurred in humans. For the
main dataset with sequences from humans and camels,
tMRCA was estimated to be September 2008 (95% Con-
fidence Interval: September 2005-June 2011) of Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia origin. For the human subset, tMRCA for
all taxa was March 2011 (CI: June 2009-November
2011), and for the camel subset, tMRCA was March
2012 (CI: July 2011-November 2012) as mentioned
above.
Fig. 6 Summary of reported basic reproduction numbers from literature. (a) includes all basic reproductive numbers found through literature
search. (b) Close-up excludes hospital specific outbreak R0’s
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There were three aims for this paper: (1) to examine
case incidence trends over time and geographic area
using epidemiological information, (2) to trace evolu-
tionary history of the virus in circulation using genetic
data and (3) to explore ways in which these two analyses
can be combined to design public health interventions.
While we aimed to have a thorough and complete rep-
resentation of all contact tracing conducted the data may
not be exhaustive. We chose PubMed as the source for
peer-reviewed literature since it contains relevant articles
from life science and medical journals, and we believe the
flexibility in article search and use of MeSH terms are its
strong points. In addition, the database and GenBank are
overseen by the same organization (National Library of
Medicine), which allowed us to link sequence meta-data
with literature. However, PubMed does not include disser-
tations and conference proceedings that may be relevant
and may be biased against articles written in languages
other than English.
Non-heterogeneous sequencing of MERS-CoV is a
limitation of this study. Some patients have beensampled and had their MERS-CoV sequenced multiple
times while others were not reached. Duplicate se-
quences from single patients were excluded based on
available meta-data since sampling bias can create ap-
parent sinks that are not present in reality [82]. Better
sampling and meta-data annotation would greatly aid
further analysis in this regard.
Saudi Arabian sequences dominate the phylogeo-
graphic tree with greatest number of sequences and
large number of probable ancestors (Figs. 3 and 4). This
was expected since overwhelming majority of MERS
cases have been reported there. Although Saudi Arabia
had the largest amount of genetic sequences available
which may skew the phylogenetic analysis, it also had
the most number of MERS cases. Thus, the number of
sequences was relatively proportional to the number of
cases for the country. Saudi Arabia was the most fre-
quent ancestor for many foreign exports, and phylogen-
etic data indicated that the direction of probable
transmission was always from MERS endemic region of
Middle East to non-endemic regions, such as Europe
and Asia.
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population such as central Saudi Arabia, may be a hub
of genetically diverse MERS-CoV’s, introduced by pas-
sage of people and animals [83]. For example, the two
cases exported to US were genetically dissimilar even
though they were both healthcare workers returning
from Saudi Arabia, the 348US14 sequence clustered with
the hospital outbreak of Jeddah 2014 while the other US
sequence 349US14 formed a distinct clade with Riyadh
[84]. The Jeddah sequences seem most genetically simi-
lar to MERS-CoV isolated from a camel in Qatar
(286QA14), even though Jeddah is located in the West
coast of Saudi Arabia and Qatar borders the East. The
intermixing of geographic backgrounds and phylogenetic
clustering seem consistent with the theory on presence
of several circulating MERS-CoV’s in Arabian Peninsula
due to movement of animals and people. Geographical
distribution of camels and human MERS-CoV cases are
found to be highly correlated [85]. Since majority of hu-
man cases have been concentrated in the Middle East
and camels in this region showed high seroprevalence of
MERS-CoV antibodies, there has been ongoing testing
in other camel dwelling regions, such as Africa and Asia
[86–89]. Seropositivity ranging from 14.3 to 100% have
been found in countries with dromedaries and a nice
summary covering these studies is provided by Omrani
et al. [90].
The later tMRCA for the camels (March 2012) relative
to tMRCA for CoV isolated from humans (March 2011),
was unexpected since antibodies against MERS-CoV
have been detected in camels from samples archived as
early as 1980s, but this may be due to dearth of early se-
quences from camels [87, 88, 91]. Earliest CoV isolates
from camels were sequenced in 2013 and the short sam-
pling timeframe from 2013 to 2015 makes the root of
the tree less than reliable [92, 93]. While antibodies have
been isolated from archived samples, the virus itself has
not been successfully recovered; these historical samples
may have been isolated in the latter part of the infection
or much later after virus has cleared from the system.
Other studies have shown that the virus most likely
circulated in camels first becoming genetically diver-
gent even within a single country, before jumping to
human hosts, and because of the wide prevalence of
seropositivity along with different lineages of CoV in
camels, more MERS-CoV infections from camels to
humans are bound to occur in the future [49, 87]. Never-
theless, this hypothesis cannot be validated without testing
for MERS-CoV antibodies or even MERS-CoV in historical
human samples [17].
Seasonality of MERS has been previously hypothesized
from the high incidence of cases during spring and early
summer months and it has been postulated that this may
be correlated to the camel birthing pattern; young,newborn camels encountering MERS-CoV for the first
time may get ill and transmit the virus to humans [13, 94,
95]. However, outbreaks in latter half of 2015 and early
2016 countered against the expected seasonality [96].
Infectiousness of MERS-CoV isolated from camels has
been demonstrated by Raj et al., and shepherds and
slaughterhouse workers have been shown to have 15 to
23 times higher proportion of individuals with MERS
antibodies than the general population [97, 98]. And
zoonotic transmission is an important factor to take into
account since evolutionary rates of the virus may be dif-
ferent in humans and camels [99]. As MERS-CoV in
camels seem to be much more prevalent and as shown
here, genetically diverse, contacts with camels should be
engaged with proper personal protection equipment,
and public awareness about MERS-CoV infection related
to camels should be raised.
In surveys conducted regarding MERS awareness of
the Saudi Arabian public, less than half (47.1% and
48.9%) were aware that bats and camels could be pri-
mary sources of MERS-CoV [100, 101]. And there was
an optimistic outlook on the fatality rate and treatment
of the viral infection which may in turn be factors keep-
ing the mild cases from seeking medical attention. Only
half of the pilgrims surveyed by Alqahtani et al. were
aware of MERS and about quarter stated drinking camel
milk or visiting a camel farm as possible activities to be
pursued during Hajj [102]. In a 2013 study, no MERS-
CoV was detected amongst over 1000 pilgrims tested,
but 2% of those tested in 2014 were positive [103, 104].
The crowded living quarters during Hajj can impair
adequate infection control, so health agencies have recom-
mend visiting pilgrims to carefully wash hands, consume
hygienic foods and isolate themselves when ill [105, 106].
Awareness among health care providers should be raised
as well. Superspreading is commonly observed in hospital
settings because of the sustained contact in close quarters,
medical treatments generating aerosolized virus and sus-
ceptibility of hospitalized patients [21]. Even in the endemic
nation of Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Health identified is-
sues such as ambiguity on MERS case definition, inad-
equate infection control and overcrowding to be sources of
hospital outbreaks [107]. Similar concerns have been raised
in Korea as well; doctor shopping and suboptimal infection
control due to crowded hospital rooms seem to have prop-
agated the spread nationwide [19].
An interesting facet of this international analysis was
the difference in outcomes for MERS-CoV infected pa-
tients depending on where they are located. About 41% of
patients in the Middle Eastern and African countries died
[1]. Fatality in Europe was 47% where about half of those
infected died, most likely due to severity of illness in cases
transported there for treatment. Asian countries, on the
other hand, have an atypical 20.3% case fatality.
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number via Bayesian analysis but the mixing of human
and camel sequences with multiple introductions of
MERS-CoV from animals to humans was not possible
to model. However, from the literature review, many re-
searchers seem to have reached consistent conclusion
that the R0 is less than 1 even in endemic countries;
notable deviations arose only when MERS-CoV was in-
troduced to a hospital setting then R0 increased by
folds. Superspreading has been cited to be responsible
for this trend since the exponential number of trans-
missions by a few can raise the R0 [76].
Although fundamental and gravely essential part of
epidemiological investigation contact tracing is costly, labor
intensive and prone to human error. Along with many
cases where possible sources of transmissions are unknown,
zoonotic transmissions were at times conjectural, based on
patients’ occupation or recall of food consumption. Never-
theless, we were able to illustrate known and probable
transmission events starting from first known cases of
MERS to recent cases of 2016. In addition, we have
conducted Bayesian phylogeographic analysis of MERS-
CoV strains in both humans and camels, which is the most
up-to-date and comprehensive, to our knowledge.
Purely epidemiological data such as incidence reports
and contact tracing can be prone to inaccuracies but can
provide background information on individual cases and
population level transmission. Genetic data circumvents
human errors and presents quantitative information about
an infectious agent, but it is not fully informative without
accompanying details on collection. Using phylodynamics
to investigate evolutionary history of pathogen can add in-
dispensable details to curb an outbreak such as identifying
most closely related cases and predicting origin of the
virus, revealing additional details at molecular level when
epidemiological tracing is inadequate. As demonstrated
with MERS, combining these two methods in a holistic
approach is valuable for understanding pathogen history
and transmission in order to implement effective public
health measures.
Conclusion
Through combination of epidemiological data and genetic
analysis, we present evolutionary history of MERS-CoV
affecting Middle East and beyond with focus on hospital
outbreaks and zoonotic transmissions.
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Additional file 1: Table S1. List of sequences used for analysis. Column
“Label” corresponds to labels for sequences. presented in Figures 3 and 4
with country (by 2-letter ISO country code) and year of collection; countries,
sources, and dates (month-year) are based on information in GenBank or
related publication (indicated in Reference column). (DOCX 128 kb)Additional file 2: Figure S1. Results of recombination analysis. Out of
all 196 MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences, two strains were detected by
Bootscan/Recscan method in RDP as recombinant strains. Figure S2.
Likelihood mapping of MERS ORF1a/b (a) main dataset, (b) human
subset, and (c) camel subset. Main dataset has both camel and human
sequences. Each dot represents the likelihoods of the three possible
unrooted trees for a set of four randomly selected sequences: dots close
to the corners represent tree-like phylogenetic signal and those at the
sides represent network-like signal. The central area of the likelihood map
represents star-like signal of unresolved phylogenetic information. Figure S3.
Temporal signal analysis using TempEst. Plots of the root-to-tip genetic
distance against sampling time are shown for phylogenies estimated from
three alignments: (a) main dataset with both human and camel sequences,
(b) human sequences, and (c) camel sequences. Figure S4. Time-scaled
phylogeographic tree of MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences isolated from
humans and camels by country. Each color shown in legend represents
country of sampled sequence (tip branches) as well as ancestral lineage
(internal branches) inferred by Bayesian phylogeography. Brown camel
symbols represent MERS-CoV sequences isolated from camels. * represents
posterior probability for the clade >0.90. ** >0.95 and *** >0.99. Figure S5.
Time-scaled phylogeographic tree of MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences isolated
from humans by city. Each color shown in legend represents city or region
of sampled sequence (tip branches) as well as ancestral lineage (internal
branches) inferred by Bayesian phylogeography. * represents posterior
probability for the clade >0.90. ** for >0.95 and *** for >0.99. Figure S6.
Time-scaled phylogeographic tree of MERS-CoV ORF1a/b sequences isolated
from humans by country. Each color shown in legend represents country of
sampled sequence (tip branches) as well as ancestral lineage (internal
branches) inferred by Bayesian phylogeography. * represents posterior
probability for the clade >0.90. ** for >0.95 and *** for >0.99. (ZIP 945 kb)
Abbreviations
CoV: Coronavirus; MCMC: Markov chain Monte Carlo; MERS: Middle East
respiratory syndrome; MERS-CoV: Middle East respiratory syndrome-





MP and JM are supported by the Virogenesis project. The VIROGENESIS
project receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation program under grant agreement No. 634650.
Availability of data and materials
List of all sequences accessed from GenBank [29] are included in the
Additional file 1.
Authors’ contributions
MS and MP framed the research question. JM collected literature data and EC
conducted all preliminary and bioinformatics analyses with support from MC. JM
prepared the manuscript. All authors reviewed and approved the manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Author details
1Department of Epidemiology, College of Public Health & Health Professions
and College of Medicine, University of Florida, 2004 Mowry Rd, Gainesville, FL
32610-0231, USA. 2Department of Infectious, Parasitic and Immune-mediated
Diseases, National Institute of Health, Viale Regina Elena, 299, 00161 Rome,
Italy. 3Department of Public Health and Infectious Diseases, Sapienza
University of Rome, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5, 00185 Rome, Italy. 4Department of
Min et al. Global Health Research and Policy  (2016) 1:14 Page 12 of 14Pathology, Immunology and Laboratory Medicine, Emerging Pathogens
Institute, University of Florida, 2055 Mowry Rd, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA.
5Department of Clinical Pathology and Microbiology Laboratory, University of
Biomedical Campus, Via Alvaro del Portillo, 21, Rome, Italy.
Received: 14 July 2016 Accepted: 14 September 2016
References
1. World Health Organization. WHO | Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV). World Health Organization. 2016. http://www.who.
int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/. Accessed 26 Jun 2016.
2. Cowling BJ, Park M, Fang VJ, Wu P, Leung GM, Wu JT. Preliminary
epidemiological assessment of MERS-CoV outbreak in South Korea, May to
June 2015. Euro Surveill. 2015;20(25):7–13.
3. Chan JFW, Lau SKP, To KKW, Cheng VCC, Woo PCY, Yuen K-Y. Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus: another zoonotic betacoronavirus
causing SARS-like disease. Clin Microbiol Rev. 2015;28:465–522.
4. Coleman CM, Frieman MB. Coronaviruses: important emerging human
pathogens. J Virol. 2014;88:5209–12.
5. Hu B, Ge X, Wang L-F, Shi Z. Bat origin of human coronaviruses. Virol J.
2015;12:221.
6. Mohd HA, Al-Tawfiq JA, Memish ZA. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) origin and animal reservoir. Virol J. 2016;13:87.
7. van den Brand JM, Smits SL, Haagmans BL. Pathogenesis of Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus. J Pathol. 2015;235:175–84.
8. Health Protection Agency. Evidence of person-to-person transmission within
a family cluster of novel coronavirus infections, United Kingdom, February
2013. Euro Surveill. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) - Health Comunication Unit; 2013. http://www.eurosurveillance.org/
ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=20427. Accessed 21 Dec 2015.
9. Alsolamy S. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. Crit Care Med. 2015;43:1283–
90.
10. Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, Korean Center for Disease Control
and Prevention. 2015 메르스 [MERS] Incidence Handling Guide. 2015.
http://cdc.go.kr/CDC/cms/cmsFileDownload.jsp?fid=5747&cid=63292&
fieldName=attach1&index=1. Accessed 19 Oct 2015.
11. Milne-Price S, Miazgowicz KL, Munster VJ. The emergence of the Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus. Pathog Dis. 2014;71:121–36.
12. de Sousa R, Reusken C, Koopmans M. MERS coronavirus: data gaps for
laboratory preparedness. J Clin Virol. 2014;59:4–11.
13. Al-Tawfiq JA, Memish Z. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus:
epidemiology and disease control measures. Infect Drug Resist. 2014;3:
281–7.
14. Mackay IM, Arden KE. Middle East respiratory syndrome: an emerging
coronavirus infection tracked by the crowd. Virus Res. 2015;202:60–88.
15. Otter JA, Donskey C, Yezli S, Douthwaite S, Goldenberg SD, Weber DJ.
Transmission of SARS and MERS coronaviruses and influenza virus in
healthcare settings: the possible role of dry surface contamination. J Hosp
Infect. 2016;92:235–50.
16. Bin SY, Heo JY, Song MS, Lee J, Kim EH, Park SJ, et al. Environmental
contamination and viral shedding in MERS patients during MERS-CoV
outbreak in South Korea. Clin Infect Dis. 2015;62:755–60.
17. Zumla A, Hui DS, Perlman S. Middle East respiratory syndrome. Lancet. 2015;
386:995–1007.
18. Al-Tawfiq JA, Memish ZA. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus:
transmission and phylogenetic evolution. Trends Microbiol. 2014;22:573–9.
19. Ki M. 2015 MERS outbreak in Korea: hospital-to-hospital transmission.
Epidemiol Health. 2015;37:e2015033.
20. Lu G, Wang Q, Gao GF. Bat-to-human: spike features determining “host
jump” of coronaviruses SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and beyond. Trends Microbiol.
2015;23:468–78.
21. Chowell G, Abdirizak F, Lee S, Lee J, Jung E, Nishiura H, et al. Transmission
characteristics of MERS and SARS in the healthcare setting: a comparative
study. BMC Med. 2015;13:210.
22. Durai P, Batool M, Shah M, Choi S. Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus: transmission, virology and therapeutic targeting to aid in
outbreak control. Exp Mol Med. 2015;47:e181.
23. Grenfell BT, Pybus OG, Gog JR, Wood JLN, Daly JM, Mumford JA, et al.
Unifying the epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics of pathogens.
Science. 2004;303:327–32.24. Khan KS, Kunz R, Kleijnen J, Antes G. Five steps to conducting a systematic
review. J R Soc Med. 2003;96:118–21.
25. Korean Ministry of Health and Wellfare. Hospitals with known MERS
exposure July 10. 2015. http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/187344/ACS/
List_of_MERS_affected_Hospitals.pdf. Accessed 19 Oct 2015.
26. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. News and
epidemiological updates. 2016. http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/
coronavirus-infections/Pages/news_and_epidemiological_updates.aspx.
Accessed 26 June 2016.
27. SAS. http://www.sas.com/en_us/software/sas9.html. Accessed 1 Aug 2015.
28. Evidence Partners. DistillerSR Forest Plot Generator. https://distillercer.com/
resources/forest-plot-generator/. Accessed 2 May 2016.
29. NCBI. GenBank. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/. Accessed 16 Mar
2016.
30. Thompson JD, Gibson TJ, Plewniak F, Jeanmougin F, Higgins DG. The
CLUSTAL_X windows interface: flexible strategies for multiple sequence
alignment aided by quality analysis tools. Nucleic Acids Res. 1997;25:4876–82.
31. Hall T. BioEdit: a user-friendly biological sequence alignment editor and
analysis program for Windows 95/98/NT. Nucleic Acids Symp Ser. 1999;41:
95–8.
32. Swofford DL. PAUP*. Phylogenetic Analysis Using Parsimony (*and Other
Methods). Vers. 4.0. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates; 2002.
http://people.sc.fsu.edu/~dswofford/paup_test/. Accessed 22 Jan 2016.
33. Posada D, Crandall KA. MODELTEST: testing the model of DNA substitution.
Bioinformatics. 1998;14:817–8.
34. Martin DP, Murrell B, Golden M, Khoosal A, Muhire B. RDP4: detection and
analysis of recombination patterns in virus genomes. Virus Evol. 2015;1:1–5.
35. Martin D, Posada D, Crandall K, Williamson C. A modified bootscan
algorithm for automated identification of recombinant sequences and
recombination breakpoints. AIDS Res Hum Retroviruses. 2005;21:98–102.
36. Schmidt HA, Strimmer K, Vingron M, von Haeseler A. TREE-PUZZLE:
maximum likelihood phylogenetic analysis using quartets and parallel
computing. Bioinformatics. 2002;18:502–4.
37. Strimmer K, von Haeseler A. Likelihood-mapping: a simple method to
visualize phylogenetic content of a sequence alignment. Proc Natl Acad Sci
U S A. 1997;94:6815–9.
38. Rambaut A, Lam TT, Carvalho LM, Pybus OG. Exploring the temporal
structure of heterochronous sequences using TempEst (formerly Path-O-
Gen). Virus Evol. 2016;2:vew007.
39. Drummond AJ, Suchard MA, Xie D, Rambaut A. Bayesian phylogenetics with
BEAUti and the BEAST 1.7. Mol Biol Evol. 2012;29:1969–73.
40. Drummond AJ, Rambaut A, Shapiro B, Pybus OG. Bayesian coalescent
inference of past population dynamics from molecular sequences. Mol Biol
Evol. 2005;22:1185–92.
41. Minin VN, Bloomquist EW, Suchard MA. Smooth skyride through a rough
skyline: Bayesian coalescent-based inference of population dynamics. Mol
Biol Evol. 2008;25:1459–71.
42. Drummond AJ, Nicholls GK, Rodrigo AG, Solomon W. Estimating mutation
parameters, population history and genealogy simultaneously from
temporally spaced sequence data. Genetics. 2002;161:1307–20.
43. Baele G, Lemey P, Bedford T, Rambaut A, Suchard MA, Alekseyenko AV.
Improving the accuracy of demographic and molecular clock model
comparison while accommodating phylogenetic uncertainty. Mol Biol Evol.
2012;29:2157–67.
44. Baele G, Lemey P. Bayesian evolutionary model testing in the
phylogenomics era: matching model complexity with computational
efficiency. Bioinformatics. 2013;29:1970–9.
45. Kass RE, Raftery AE. Bayes factors. J Am Stat Assoc. 1995;90:773–95.
46. Lemey P, Rambaut A, Drummond AJ, Suchard MA. Bayesian
phylogeography finds its roots. PLoS Comput Biol. 2009;5:e1000520.
47. Lemey P, Rambaut A, Welch JJ, Suchard MA. Phylogeography takes a relaxed
random walk in continuous space and time. Mol Biol Evol. 2010;27:1877–85.
48. Drosten C, Seilmaier M, Corman VM, Hartmann W, Scheible G, Sack S, et al.
Clinical features and virological analysis of a case of Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus infection. Lancet Infect Dis. 2013;13:745–51.
49. Sabir JSM, Lam TT-Y, Ahmed MMM, Li L, Shen Y, Abo-Aba SE, et al. Co-
circulation of three camel coronavirus species and recombination of MERS-
CoVs in Saudi Arabia. Science. 2016;351:81–4.
50. Seong M-W, Kim SY, Corman VM, Kim TS, Cho SI, Kim MJ, et al.
Microevolution of outbreak-associated Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus, South Korea, 2015. Emerg Infect Dis. 2016;22:327–30.
Min et al. Global Health Research and Policy  (2016) 1:14 Page 13 of 1451. Kim JI, Kim Y-J, Lemey P, Lee I, Park S, Bae J-Y, et al. The recent ancestry of
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in Korea has been shaped by
recombination. Sci Rep. 2016;6:18825.
52. Hijawi B, Abdallat M, Sayaydeh A, Alqasrawi S, Haddadin A, Jaarour N, et al.
Novel coronavirus infections in Jordan, April 2012: epidemiological findings
from a retrospective investigation. East Mediterr Heal J. 2013;19:S12–8.
53. van Boheemen S, de Graaf M, Lauber C, Bestebroer TM, Raj VS, Zaki AM, et al.
Genomic characterization of a newly discovered coronavirus associated with
acute respiratory distress syndrome in humans. MBio. 2012;3:e00473–12.
54. Bermingham A, Chand MA, Brown CS, Aarons E, Tong C, Langrish C, et al.
Severe respiratory illness caused by a novel coronavirus, in a patient
transferred to the United Kingdom from the Middle East, September 2012.
Euro Surveillance. 2012;17:20290.
55. Mailles A, Blanckaert K, Chaud P, van der Werf S, Lina B, Caro V, et al. First
cases of middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-COV)
infections in France, investigations and implications for the prevention of
human-to-human transmission, France, May 2013. Euro Surveill. 2013;18.
56. Guery B, Poissy J, el Mansouf L, Séjourné C, Ettahar N, Lemaire X, et al.
Clinical features and viral diagnosis of two cases of infection with Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus: a report of nosocomial transmission.
Lancet. 2013;381:2265–72.
57. Assiri A, Al-Tawfiq JA, Al-Rabeeah AA, Al-Rabiah FA, Al-Hajjar S, Al-Barrak A,
et al. Epidemiological, demographic, and clinical characteristics of 47 cases
of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus disease from Saudi Arabia:
a descriptive study. Lancet Infect Dis. 2013;13:752–61.
58. Assiri A, McGeer A, Perl TM, Price CS, Al Rabeeah AA, Cummings DAT, et al.
Hospital outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. N Engl J
Med. 2013;369:407–16.
59. Cotten M, Watson SJ, Kellam P, Al-Rabeeah AA, Makhdoom HQ, Assiri A,
et al. Transmission and evolution of the Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus in Saudi Arabia: a descriptive genomic study. Lancet. 2013;382:
1993–2002.
60. Memish ZA, Cotten M, Watson SJ, Kellam P, Zumla A, Alhakeem RF, et al.
Community case clusters of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
in Hafr Al-Batin, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: a descriptive genomic study. Int J
Infect Dis. 2014;23:63–8.
61. Yavarian J, Rezaei F, Shadab A, Soroush M, Gooya MM, Azad TM. Cluster of
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus infections in Iran, 2014.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2015;21:362–4.
62. Fagbo SF, Skakni L, Chu DKW, Garbati MA, Joseph M, Peiris M, et al.
Molecular epidemiology of hospital outbreak of Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2014. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015;21:1981–8.
63. Hastings DL, Tokars JI, Abdel Aziz IZAM, Alkhaldi KZ, Bensadek AT, Alraddadi
BM, et al. Outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome at tertiary care
hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 2014. Emerg Infect Dis. 2016;22:794–801.
64. Oboho IK, Tomczyk SM, Al-Asmari AM, Banjar AA, Al-Mugti H, Aloraini MS,
et al. 2014 MERS-CoV outbreak in Jeddah — a link to health care facilities. N
Engl J Med. 2015;372:846–54.
65. Drosten C, Muth D, Corman VM, Hussain R, Al Masri M, HajOmar W, et al. An
observational, laboratory-based study of outbreaks of Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus in Jeddah and Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 2014. Clin Infect Dis. 2015;60:369–77.
66. Kraaij-Dirkzwager M, Timen A, Dirksen K, Gelinck L, Leyten E, Groeneveld P,
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections in
two returning travellers in the Netherlands, May 2014. Euro Surveill. 2014;
19(21):2–7.
67. Kossyvakis A, Tao Y, Lu X, Pogka V, Tsiodras S, Emmanouil M, et al.
Laboratory investigation and phylogenetic analysis of an imported Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus case in Greece. PLoS One. 2015;10:
e0125809.
68. Korean Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015. Osong
Public Health Res Perspect. 2015;6:269–78.
69. Lu R, Wang Y, Wang W, Nie K, Zhao Y, Su J, et al. Complete genome
sequence of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
from the first imported MERS-CoV case in China. Genome Announc. 2015;3:
e00818–15.
70. Balkhy HH, Alenazi TH, Alshamrani MM, Baffoe-Bonnie H, Al-Abdely HM, El-
Saed A, et al. Nosocomial outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome in
a large tertiary care hospital — Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2015. Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep. 2016;65:163–4.71. World Health Organization. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) – Saudi Arabia. 2016. http://www.who.int/csr/don/21-june-2016-
mers-saudi-arabia/en/. Accessed 23 Jun 2016.
72. Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Van Kerkhove MD, Donnelly CA, Riley S, Rambaut A,
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: quantification of the
extent of the epidemic, surveillance biases, and transmissibility. Lancet Infec
Dis. 2014;14:50–6.
73. Breban R, Riou J, Fontanet A. Interhuman transmissibility of Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus: estimation of pandemic risk. Lancet. 2013;
382:694–9.
74. Poletto C, Pelat C, Lévy-Bruhl D, Yazdanpanah Y, Boëlle P, Colizza V.
Assessment of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
epidemic in the Middle East and risk of international spread using a novel
maximum likelihood analysis approach. Euro Surveill. 2014;19(23):13–22.
75. Majumder MS, Rivers C, Lofgren E, Fisman D. Estimation of MERS-
Coronavirus reproductive number and case fatality rate for the spring 2014
Saudi Arabia outbreak: insights from publicly available data. PLoS Curr. 2014;
6:ecurrents.outbreaks.98d2f8f3382d84f390736cd5f5fe133c.
76. Kucharski AJ, Althaus CL. The role of superspreading in Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) transmission. Euro Surveill.
2015;20(25):14–18.
77. Nishiura H, Miyamatsu Y, Chowell G, Saitoh M. Assessing the risk of
observing multiple generations of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)
cases given an imported case. Euro Surveill. 2015;20(27):6–11.
78. Hsieh Y-H. 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
nosocomial outbreak in South Korea: insights from modeling. PeerJ. 2015;3:e1505.
79. Kucharski AJ, Edmunds WJ. Characterizing the transmission potential of
zoonotic infections from minor outbreaks. PLoS Comput Biol. 2015;11:
e1004154.
80. Haagmans BL, Al Dhahiry SHS, Reusken CBEM, Raj VS, Galiano M, Myers R,
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in dromedary camels: an
outbreak investigation. Lancet Infect Dis. 2014;14:140–5.
81. Azhar EI, El-Kafrawy SA, Farraj SA, Hassan AM, Al-Saeed MS, Hashem AM, et
al. Evidence for camel-to-human transmission of MERS Coronavirus. N Engl J
Med. 2014;370:2499–505.
82. Frost SDW, Pybus OG, Gog JR, Viboud C, Bonhoeffer S, Bedford T. Eight
challenges in phylodynamic inference. Epidemics. 2015;10:88–92.
83. Cotten M, Watson SJ, Zumla AI, Makhdoom HQ, Palser AL, Ong SH, et al.
Spread, circulation, and evolution of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus. MBio. 2014;5:e01062–13.
84. Kapoor M, Pringle K, Kumar A, Dearth S, Liu L, Lovchik J, et al. Clinical and
laboratory findings of the first imported case of Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus to the United States. Clin Infect Dis. 2014;59:1511–8.
85. Hemida MG, Elmoslemany A, Al-Hizab F, Alnaeem A, Almathen F, Faye B,
et al. Dromedary camels and the transmission of Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Transbound Emerg Dis. 2015. doi:10.
1111/tbed.12401.
86. Perera R, Wang P, Gomaa M, El-Shesheny R, Kandeil A, Bagato O, et al.
Seroepidemiology for MERS coronavirus using microneutralisation and
pseudoparticle virus neutralisation assays reveal a high prevalence of
antibody in dromedary camels in Egypt, June 2013. Euro Surveill. 2013;
18(36):8–14.
87. Alagaili AN, Briese T, Mishra N, Kapoor V, Sameroff SC, de Wit E, et al. Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus infection in dromedary camels in
Saudi Arabia. MBio. 2014;5:e00884–14.
88. Alexandersen S, Kobinger GP, Soule G, Wernery U. Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus antibody reactors among camels in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, in 2005. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2014;61:105–8.
89. Nowotny N, Kolodziejek J. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) in dromedary camels, Oman, 2013. Euro Surveill. 2014;19:20781.
90. Omrani AS, Al-Tawfiq JA, Memish ZA. Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV): animal to human interaction. Pathog Glob Health.
2015;109:354–62.
91. Müller MA, Corman VM, Jores J, Meyer B, Younan M, Liljander A, et al. MERS
Coronavirus Neutralizing Antibodies in Camels, Eastern Africa, 1983–1997.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2014;20:2093–5.
92. Briese T, Mishra N, Jain K, Zalmout IS, Jabado OJ, Karesh WB, et al. Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus quasispecies that include
homologues of human isolates revealed through whole-genome analysis
and virus cultured from dromedary camels in Saudi Arabia. MBio. 2014;5:
e01146–14.
Min et al. Global Health Research and Policy  (2016) 1:14 Page 14 of 1493. Chu DKW, Poon LLM, Gomaa MM, Shehata MM, Perera RAPM, Abu Zeid D,
et al. MERS Coronaviruses in dromedary Camels, Egypt. Emerg Infect Dis.
2014;20:1049–53.
94. Wernery U, Corman VM, Wong EYM, Tsang AKL, Muth D, Lau SKP, et al.
Acute Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus infection in livestock
dromedaries, Dubai, 2014. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015;21:1019–22.
95. Memish ZA, Cotten M, Meyer B, Watson SJ, Alsahafi AJ, Al Rabeeah AA, et al.
Human infection with MERS Coronavirus after exposure to infected camels,
Saudi Arabia, 2013. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014;20:1012–5.
96. Wernery U, El Rasoul IH, Wong EY, Joseph M, Chen Y, Jose S, et al. A
phylogenetically distinct Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
detected in a dromedary calf from a closed dairy herd in Dubai with rising
seroprevalence with age. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2015;4:e74.
97. Müller MA, Meyer B, Corman VM, Al-Masri M, Turkestani A, Ritz D, et al.
Presence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus antibodies in
Saudi Arabia: a nationwide, cross-sectional, serological study. Lancet Infect
Dis. 2015;15:559–64.
98. Raj VS, Farag EABA, Reusken CBEM, Lamers MM, Pas SD, Voermans J, et al.
Isolation of MERS Coronavirus from a dromedary camel, Qatar, 2014. Emerg
Infect Dis. 2014;20:1339–42.
99. Gray RR, Salemi M. Integrative molecular phylogeography in the context of
infectious diseases on the human-animal interface. Parasitology. 2012;139:
1939–51.
100. Al-Mohrej OA, Al-Shirian SD, Al-Otaibi SK, Tamim HM, Masuadi EM, Fakhoury
HM. Is the Saudi public aware of Middle East respiratory syndrome? J Infect
Public Health. 2016;9:259–66.
101. Almutairi KM, Al Helih EM, Moussa M, Boshaiqah AE, Saleh Alajilan A,
Vinluan JM, et al. Awareness, attitudes, and practices related to coronavirus
pandemic among public in Saudi Arabia. Fam Community Health. 2015;38:
332–40.
102. Alqahtani AS, Wiley KE, Tashani M, Heywood AE, Willaby HW, BinDhim NF,
et al. Camel exposure and knowledge about MERS-CoV among Australian
Hajj pilgrims in 2014. Virol Sin. 2016;31:89–93.
103. Barasheed O, Rashid H, Alfelali M, Tashani M, Azeem M, Bokhary H, et al.
Viral respiratory infections among Hajj pilgrims in 2013. Virol Sin. 2014;29:
364–71.
104. Memish ZA, Al-Tawfiq JA, Makhdoom HQ, Al-Rabeeah AA, Assiri A,
Alhakeem RF, et al. Screening for Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus infection in hospital patients and their healthcare worker and
family contacts: a prospective descriptive study. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2014;
20:469–74.
105. Department of Health. Travel Health Service Advice for pilgrims visiting
Mecca, Saudi Arabia (Hajj and Umrah). Government of HKSAR. 2014. http://
www.travelhealth.gov.hk/english/travel_special_needs/pilgrims.html.
Accessed 29 Dec 2015.
106. Watson JT, Gerber SI. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). In: Brunette
GW, editor. CDC Heal Inf Int Travel. New York: Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention; 2016. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2016/
infectious-diseases-related-to-travel/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-mers.
Accessed 29 Dec 2015.
107. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health. Weekly Monitor MERS-CoV.
2016. http://www.moh.gov.sa/en/CCC/Documents/Volume-2-Issue15-
Tuesday-April 12-2016%E2%80%8B.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2016.•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
